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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by 
concluding that Mark Madden, a nonparty witness in this 
civil matter, is entitled to claim a journalist's privilege. We 
hold that he is not and will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
We will summarize only those facts necessary to give 
context to the issue. Appellant Titan Sports, Inc., and its 
competitor, Turner Broadcasting Systems (TBS), are the 
most prominent professional wrestling promoters in the 
United States. TBS's "World Championship Wrestling" 
(WCW) has challenged Titan's "World Wrestling Federation" 
(WWF) to engage in "interpromotional events," wherein 
WCW wrestling personalities would compete with WWF 
personalities. Titan has refused to permit any of its 
wrestlers to engage in the activities. 
 
Titan sued TBS in the United States District Court for the 
District of Connecticut alleging unfair trade practices, 
copyright infringement and other pendent state law claims, 
none of which are germane to this appeal. Titan Sports Inc. 
v. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc., No. 396-cv-01139 (D. 
Conn.) (the Connecticut action). As part of the discovery 
process in the Connecticut action, however, Titan issued a 
subpoena to take the deposition of Mark Madden, a 
nonparty witness who is employed by WCW, and resided in 
the Western District of Pennsylvania. 
 
WCW employs Madden to produce tape-recorded 
commentaries, which are replayed to callers on WCW's 900- 
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number hotline. These commentaries promote upcoming 
WCW wrestling events and pay-per-view television 
programs, announce the results of wrestling matches and 
discuss wrestlers' personal lives and careers. Madden 
asserts that in the course of preparing statements for the 
WCW hotline, he receives information from confidential 
sources. He admits, however, that his announcements are 
as much entertainment as journalism. 
 
During a deposition, Madden refused to identify the 
sources of certain of his allegedly false and misleading 
statements recorded for the WCW's 900-number hotline. 
Madden, through counsel, invoked a "journalist's privilege" 
and the protection of the Pennsylvania Journalist's Shield 
Law, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5942.1 Titan filed a "Motion 
to Enforce Subpoena and Otherwise Compel Discovery by a 
Nonmoving Party." After Titan moved to enforce the 
subpoena, counsel for Madden and the WCW interposed 
the qualified federal common law privilege which protects 
journalists from revealing their confidential sources. 
 
The district court denied Titan's motion insofar as it 
sought to compel Madden to identify the sources from 
which he got information for his commentaries. The district 
court concluded that Madden was a "journalist" with 
standing to assert the privilege because he intended to 
disseminate information to third parties. The district court 
also held that Madden's interest in protecting his sources 
was not outweighed by the need for disclosure. Titan now 
appeals. 
 
II. 
 
The somewhat unusual procedural posture of this case 
requires that we discuss briefly our jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal. We have jurisdiction over "all final decisions of the 
district courts. . ." 28 U.S.C. S 1291.2 A final decision of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court's opinion concerned only the federal privilege. The 
applicability of the Pennsylvania law is not appealed. 
 
2. In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. S 1291 provides that "the courts of 
appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from allfinal decisions of the 
district courts of the United States . . . ." 
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district court means, with limited exceptions, an order that 
ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the 
district court to do but execute the judgment. Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457 
(1978). Ordinarily, a pretrial discovery order such as this 
one is not considered final. Enprotech Corp. v. Renda, 983 
F.2d 17, 20-21, (3rd Cir. 1993), (an order denying a pretrial 
civil discovery motion to compel production of a document 
was not final and appealable). The typical remedy for one 
aggrieved by an order denying a discovery request is to 
await final judgment before appealing. Id. 
 
The order appealed from in this case is not a typical 
discovery order. Although it relates to discovery and the 
deposition of a nonparty witness, it has not been entered by 
the district court where the case has been filed and is 
currently pending. The district court for the District of 
Connecticut will ultimately rule on the merits, and an 
appeal from its final judgment will be heard by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Other courts have 
recognized an "exception to the nonfinality of discovery 
orders where a district court, other than the district court 
before which the main action is pending, issues an order 
denying discovery against a nonparty." Hooker v. 
Continental Life Insurance Co., 965 F.2d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 
1992); citing Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng'n, Inc., 
813 F.2d 1207, 1209 (Fed.Cir. 1987).3 The premise for this 
exception is that these orders involve nonparties and are 
issued by district courts other than the one in which the 
principal action is pending, thereby eliminating any avenue 
for effective appellate review. 
 
We agree with this premise but believe, rather than as an 
exception, finality for purposes of our jurisdiction in this 
circumstance is determined more directly by asking 
whether the aggrieved entity has any means, other than an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. When an ancillary district court enters an order against a nonparty 
which compels discovery, such an order is not immediately appealable, 
leaving the nonparty with the option to either comply with the discovery 
order or submit to contempt proceedings from which the nonparty may 
then appeal. See Hooker, 965 F.2d at 905 n.1 (citing Federal Trade 
Comm'n v. Alaska Land Leasing Inc., 778 F.2d 577, 578 (10th Cir. 
1985)). 
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immediate appeal before us, to obtain appellate review of 
the district court's decision. For Titan, the answer is no, 
because the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit does 
not have jurisdiction to review this order of the Western 
District of Pennsylvania. Were we to reject jurisdiction, 
appellate review of this order would be impossible. 
Consequently, because we are the only forum that may 
review the decision, we deem it final and conclude that we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 to review it. 
 
III. 
 
The decision we review is the district court's order 
granting a journalist's privilege to Madden. The issue is 
whether he has status as a journalist to invoke the 
protections of the privilege. We conclude that he does not. 
Because this is a purely legal question, our review is 
plenary. Bradgate Assoc. v. Fellows, Red & Assoc., 999 
F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1993). We note at the outset that 
testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges are not 
favored. Indeed, the Supreme Court has not shown 
enthusiasm for the creation of constitutional privileges 
because these privileges "contravene a fundamental 
principle of our jurisprudence that the public has a right to 
every man's evidence." United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 
323, 331, 70 S. Ct. 724, 730 (1950). Such privileges should 
not be "lightly created or expansively construed, for they 
are in derogation of the search for truth." United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3108 (1974). 
Pretrial discovery is therefore, "accorded a broad and liberal 
treatment." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S. Ct. 
385, 392 (1947). If no claim of privilege applies, a non-party 
can be compelled to produce any matter "relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending action" or 
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 
 
Nonetheless, we have recognized that when a journalist, 
in the course of gathering the news, acquires facts that 
become a target of discovery, a qualified privilege against 
compelled disclosure appertains. Riley v. City of Chester, 
612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979) (journalist's privilege for civil 
cases); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 
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1980) (journalist's privilege for criminal cases). Premised 
upon the First Amendment, the privilege recognizes 
society's interest in protecting the integrity of the 
newsgathering process, and in ensuring the freeflow of 
information to the public. It is an interest of "sufficient legal 
importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of 
facts needed in the administration of justice." Herbert v. 
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 183, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 1652 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
 
Although we have determined that a journalist's privilege 
exists, we have never decided who qualifies as a "journalist" 
for purposes of asserting it. The Supreme Court has warned 
of the difficulties in such an undertaking: 
 
       [S]ooner or later, it [will] become necessary to define 
       those categories of newsmen who qualify for the 
       privilege -- a questionable procedure in light of the 
       traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right 
       of the lonely pamphleteer just as much as the large, 
       metropolitan publisher. 
 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-04, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 
2668 (1972). 
 
We have found few cases that discuss who, beyond those 
employed by the traditional media, has status to raise the 
journalist's privilege. Courts have previously permitted 
documentary film-makers to invoke the protections of the 
journalist's privilege. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 563 F.2d 
433, 436 (10th Cir. 1977). Also, authors of technical 
publications and professional investigative books have been 
permitted to claim the privilege. See Apicella v. McNeil Lab. 
Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (technical publications 
are within the scope of journalist's privilege because the 
traditional doctrine of freedom of the press is the right of all 
types of reporters); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (professional investigative book author has 
status to claim journalist's privilege). No other court, 
however, has considered whether the privilege may be 
invoked by those like Madden who are neither 
"pamphleteers" nor "metropolitan publishers," and certainly 
not engaged in investigating, publishing, reporting or 
broadcasting in the traditional sense. 
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To date, only one other court of appeals has fashioned a 
test to answer the question of who has status to invoke a 
journalistic privilege. In von Bulow v. von Bulow, the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit identified the principles 
underlying the application of the journalist's privilege. 811 
F.2d 136, 142 (2nd Cir. 1987). First, the court recognized 
that the process of newsgathering is a protected, albeit 
qualified, right under the First Amendment. This right 
emanates from the strong public policy supporting the 
unfettered communication of information by a journalist to 
the public. Second, the court required a true journalist, at 
the beginning of the news-gathering process, to have the 
intention of disseminating her information to the public. 
Third, the court stated that an individual may successfully 
claim the journalist's privilege if she is involved in activities 
traditionally associated with the gathering and 
dissemination of news, even though she may not ordinarily 
be a member of the institutionalized press. Fourth, the 
relationship between the putative journalist and her 
sources may be confidential or nonconfidential. And fifth, 
unpublished resource material likewise may be protected. 
 
In holding that "the individual claiming the privilege must 
demonstrate, through competent evidence, the intent to use 
the material in order to disseminate information for the 
public and such intent must have existed at the inception 
of the newsgathering process," the court turned to its 
opinion in Baker v. F&F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2nd Cir. 
1972). Baker was a civil rights case in which it was alleged 
that racial discrimination was practiced in the sale of 
housing in Chicago. During discovery, the plaintiffs 
deposed the editor of the Columbia Journalism Review, who 
had written an article on "blockbusting" -- an allegedly 
illegal housing application process -- ten years earlier. That 
article, which had been published in the Saturday Evening 
Post, had been based, in part, on information forwarded to 
the editor by an anonymous real estate agent. The editor 
refused to disclose the identity of the real estate agent at 
deposition. 
 
The court held that the editor could not be compelled to 
disclose the identity of his source. Central to the court's 
holding was its concern that the "deterrent effect such 
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disclosure is likely to have upon future `undercover' 
investigative reporting . . . threatens freedom of the press 
and the public's need to be informed. Id. at 782 (emphasis 
in original). Based on the rationale of Baker, the court 
concluded that "the critical question in determining if a 
person falls within the class of persons protected by the 
journalist's privilege is whether the person, at the inception 
of the investigatory process, had the intent to disseminate 
to the public the information obtained through the 
investigation." von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 143. In contrast, a 
person who "gathers information for personal reasons, 
unrelated to dissemination of information to the public, will 
not be deterred from undertaking his search simply by 
rules which permit discovery of that information in a later 
civil proceeding." Id. In other words, von Bulow holds that 
the purpose of the journalist's privilege was not solely to 
protect newspaper or television reporters, but to protect the 
activity of "investigative reporting." Id. at 142-43. 
 
Indeed, in adopting the test set forth in the von Bulow 
decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
indicated that the journalist's privilege was designed not to 
protect a particular journalist, but "the activity of 
investigative reporting more generally." Shoen v. Shoen, 5 
F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993). Thus, "it makes no 
difference whether the intended manner of dissemination 
was by newspaper, magazine, book, public or private 
broadcast or handbill because the press, in its historic 
connotation comprehends every sort of publication which 
affords a vehicle of information and opinion." Id. at 144 
(quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S. Ct. 666, 
669 (1938)). 
 
We find the reasoning of the court in von Bulow, and by 
extension in Shoen to be persuasive. In our view, the von 
Bulow test is consistent with the goals and concerns that 
underlie the journalist's privilege. Because this test 
emphasizes the intent behind the newsgathering process 
rather than the mode of dissemination, it is consistent with 
the Supreme Court's recognition that the "press" includes 
all publications that contribute to the free flow of 
information. See Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452, 58 S. Ct. at 669 
(1938). This test is also consistent with the Supreme 
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Court's concerns that the privilege apply only to legitimate 
members of the press. Id. at 457, S. Ct. at 674. This test 
does not grant status to any person with a manuscript, a 
web page or a film, but requires an intent at the inception 
of the newsgathering process to disseminate investigative 
news to the public. As we see it, the privilege is only 
available to persons whose purposes are those traditionally 
inherent to the press; persons gathering news for 
publication. It is the burden of the party claiming the 
privilege to establish their right to its protection. von Bulow, 
811 F.2d at 144. 
 
The district court correctly looked to von Bulow as the 
appropriate test to use in determining who qualifies as a 
"journalist" for purposes of claiming privilege. We believe, 
however, that the district court read the von Bulow decision 
too expansively and in doing so elided the requirement that 
the individual be engaged in the activity of news gathering 
or investigative reporting. The district court believed that 
because Madden "sought, gathered or received" materials 
from the WCW with the intention of disseminating that 
material, he was a journalist. We conclude that more is 
required to claim the privilege. 
 
As we have indicated previously, we agree with von Bulow 
that the person claiming privilege must be engaged in the 
process of "investigative reporting" or "news gathering." 
Moreover, we agree with Shoen, which held that the critical 
question for deciding whether a person may invoke the 
journalist's privilege is "whether she is gathering news for 
dissemination to the public." Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1293. We 
hold that individuals are journalists when engaged in 
investigative reporting, gathering news, and have the intent 
at the beginning of the news-gathering process to 
disseminate this information to the public. Madden does 
not pass this test. 
 
Madden's activities in this case cannot be considered 
"reporting," let alone "investigative reporting." By his own 
admission, he is an entertainer, not a reporter, 
disseminating hype, not news. Although Madden proclaims 
himself to be "Pro Wrestling's only real journalist," 
hyperbolic self-proclamation will not suffice as proof that 
an individual is a journalist. Moreover, the record reveals 
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that all of Madden's information was given to him directly 
by WCW executives. Madden's deposition testimony 
acknowledges that WCW employees were his sole source of 
information for his commentaries. He uncovered no story 
on his own nor did he independently investigate any of the 
information given to him by WCW executives. Madden also 
fails the test in two other critical aspects: first, he was not 
gathering or investigating "news," and second, he had no 
intention at the start of his information gathering process 
to disseminate the information he acquired. Madden's work 
amounts to little more than creative fiction about 
admittedly fictional wrestling characters who have dramatic 
and ferocious-sounding pseudonyms like "Razor Ramon" 
and "Diesel." As a creative fiction author, Maddens' primary 
goal is to provide advertisement and entertainment-- not 
to gather news or disseminate information. It is clear from 
the record that Mr. Madden was not investigating "news," 
even were we to apply a generous definition of the word. 
Madden admits in his deposition that his work for the WCW 
amounts to a mix of entertainment with reporting. He 
states that "with the WCW 900 number, I say things tongue 
[in] cheek. I say things for satire value, I say things to be 
funny, and sometimes I will take something like that and 
use it for humor value." Furthermore, the record indicates 
that WCW executives told Madden to "be a little crazy, say 
off the wall stuff, entertain, use a lot of humor, sort of work 
-- sort of be like the bad guy in the literal sense, not in 
terms of what I say is always going to be false, but in terms 
of what I say is going to get people excited." 
 
Even if Madden's efforts could be considered as 
"newsgathering," his claim of privilege would still fail 
because, as an author of entertaining fiction, he lacked the 
intent at the beginning of the research process to 
disseminate information to the public. He, like other 
creators of fictional works, intends at the beginning of the 
process to create a piece of art or entertainment. Fiction or 
entertainment writers are permitted to view facts 
selectively, change the emphasis or chronology of events or 
even fill in factual gaps with fictitious events-- license a 
journalist does not have. Because Madden is not a 
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journalist, it follows that he cannot conceal his information 
within the shadow of the journalist's privilege. 4 
 
IV. 
 
To summarize, we hold that individuals claiming the 
protections of the journalist's privilege must demonstrate 
the concurrence of three elements: that they: 1) are 
engaged in investigative reporting; 2) are gathering news; 
and 3) possess the intent at the inception of the news- 
gathering process to disseminate this news to the public. 
Madden, having failed to sustain his burden, cannot protect 
his sources or his information by invoking the journalist's 
privilege. We will reverse the order and remand the cause to 
the district court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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4. We have indicated that a bona fide journalist has a qualified 
privilege. 
We do not reach the district court's balancing of the competing interests 
involved in the application of this privilege because of our determination 
that Madden does not have status to raise the privilege in the first 
place. 
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